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CHAPTER I
ll\fTRODUCTION
Descartes proposes in his Regulae a theory of simple natures (naturae simplices) as the most basic elements
of all knm·lledge.

Certain knowledge is possible only be-

cause of the clear and distinct intuition of these natures.
He further claims that all knowledge consists in various
combinations of these natures.
Though the full title of the Regulae (Rules for the
Direction of the Mind) indicates that Descartes' intention
was to provide some principles for an efficient and reliable
method of inquiry, some commentators claim that the method
presupposes at least a rudimentary epistemology.

The pre-

cise nature of this epistemology is still a matter of dispute.

A prime focus of this dispute is the doctrine of

simple natures •. One group claims that these simple natures
are ideas, and not themselves part of an extra-mental world.
\.Jitness, for example, the claim of LeBlond: ". • .1' invenI

~

taire des natures simples est presente, non comme un examen
des choses, mais seulement des idees •• • •

I f the simple

natures are, in fact, ideas, and if 1.ve take seriously the
1 Jean LeBlond, "Les natures simples chez Descartes,"
Archives de Philosophie, XIII (1937), p. 172.
1

2

claim that all knmvledge is compounded out of these ideas,
then ive must conclude that the Regulae espouses an epistemological position best characterized as representationalism.
This claim about the nature of the epistemology has,
however, been disputed by other scholars, \vho insist upon
a realist interpretation.

Consider, for example, Keeling's

position:
Ce r~alisme ne rlside pas dans le fait que les
existences sont toujours vis~es par nos id~es
et nos jugements, mais dans le fait que la rlalite existante est apprJhend~e directement, sans
l'intervention ni l'aide d'une idle ou d'un
jugement.2
To characterize the epistemology of the Regulae as a realism is to claim that to knmv the simple natures is to knmv
the extra-mental "world directly.

Thus, the simple natures

are considered to be themselves extra-mentally real.
The competing interpretations of the epistemology
of the Regulae depend, in the end, upon fundamentally different interpretations of the .doctrine of simple natures.
Are these simple natures ideas or are they extra-mental
existents?

If. the former is correct, then the epistemology

of the Regulae is representationalism; if the latter, then
it is direct realism.

The purpose of the thesis is to

assess the evidence for each of the two interpretations
concerning the status of the simple natures.
The representational interpretation is initially
2 s. v. Keeling, "Le re'alisme de Descartes et le
r~le des natures simples," Revue de l1etaphysique et T1orale
44 (1937), p. 70.

3
attractive, for under it the Regulae appear to foreshadow
the later philosophy, vlhich Descartes openly declared to
be representational.3

Those who see the Regulae as espous-

ing realism claim, though, that this same realism is present in the later philosophy. 4 Thus, each of the interpretations claims the continuity of the Cartesian doctrine as
support.

It seems useful, therefore, to conduct a careful

study of the internal evidence of the Regulae in order to
avoid reading into it a doctrine he may not have held at
that time.
To call the one interpretation a theory of ttrepresentative" ideas can be sommvhat misleading, for traditional
(e.g., the Lockean) representative theories have been doctrines about sensa or sensory images that somehmv picture
to the mind what is extramental.

If the simple natures of

Descartes are to be called representative, it cannot be in
this way.

First, Descartes did not consider such mental

3see th.e letter to Gibieuf, January 19, 1642: "I
am certain that I can have no knmvledge of 1rlhat is outside
me except by means of the ideas I have within me; and so I
take great care not to relate my judgments immediately to
things in the vwrld • • • 11 In this and all future citations
from the correspondence I employ the translation of Anthony
Kenny in Descartes: Philosophical Letters (London: Clarendon Press, 19?0).
4 Keeling, pp. 65-66. See also Brian O'Neil, "Cartesian Simple Natures~" Journal of the History of Philosophy, 10 (April, 1972;. O'Neil's recently published book,
E istemolo ical Direct Realism in Descartes' Philoso ~
"(Albuquerque: University of New Hexico Press, 1975 was
received too late for consideration in this Hork.

4

images themselves knowledge.5

Second, many of the simple

natures could not be representative in this way.

The na-

tures of the first group (thought, doubt, will, etc.) cannot be the subject of mental pictures; they refer to nothing
physical and therefore to nothing picturable.

Some of the

common notions of the third group present similar difficulties, for in this group Descartes includes principles of
inference and various necessary relations.

He claims also

that the negations of all the simple natures are themselves
simple natures.

None of these could be pictures.

If the

Cartesian simple natures are representative, it cannot be
because they provide a sensible picture or copy of extramental reality.
A somewhat different notion of representation is
required.

First, the doctrine must accomodate all those

things that Descartes regards as simple natures.

This is

best accomplished by regarding the natures as basic units
of intelligibility (intelligibilia) rather than sensa.
This successfully takes into account also his claim that
mental images are not themselves knowledge.
Second, our understanding of representation must
preserve the essential claim that we do not know extramental reality directly, but only through the mediation of
ideas.

Thus, the claim of representationalism is that what

5This will be shown in Chapter 3, in the discussion
of the objectivity of the simple natures.

5
we know directly are our own ideas.

Further, it claims

that in knowing our ideas, we have reason to believe that
we knov.; what extra-mental reality must be like.

The diffi-

culty for such an epistenology is to establish good reasons
for such confidence, without the petitio of appealing to
some extra-mental existent as guaranteeing the correlation. 6 There is_, then, a negative aspect to the representational claim:
ly.

it-le

do not knov1 extra-mental reality direct-

What we do knm.,r are our 0\'ln ideas.

According to the

Regulae the most basic ideas are the simple natures, and
all other ideas are compounded from them.
The realist position holds that what is known directly is extra-mental reality.

It claims that the intelli-

gible structure of the object and the intelligible structure as present to the mind are numerically one.

It would

reject the contention that our ideas represent reality,
because such a contention \vould deny the immediacy of the
knower's contact with the world.

Note that both positions

would claim that the knm.,rer is in immediate contact with the
known; they differ on what it is that is most immediately
known.

Under a realist interpretation the exclusively men-

tal character of the simple natures would be denied; and
their importance in knowledge would be attributed to the
6 rn the f1editations Descartes attempts to establish
this correlation of mind to lrlorld by establishing the divine guarantee. This is not a petitio if he can establish
the necessity of the existence of this divine guarantee by
appealing only to ideas.

6

claim that they

~

the extra-mental Horld, insofar as it

is intelligible.
I shall examine what I take to be the most forceful
arguments for each interpretation.

The arguments for the

realist interpretations will be for the most part, those of
Keeling and O'Neil.

The representational interpretation

presents some difficulties in this regard.

It is the re-

ceived doctrine and has been largely accepted by Cartesian
scholars without criticism.

There is, therefore, a paucity

of careful argumentation in support of it.

I will take it

upon myself to formulate the strongest arguments and most
explicit textual support for this position.
I shall, in the end, be forced to conclude that the
textual evidence of the Regulae does not yield a definitive
case for either interpretation.

I believe that the incon-

clusiveness is Descartes' mvn; he had not yet developed a
well thought out, consistent epistemology.
Regulae is

prim~rily

Because the

a work on method, it is not surprising

that no doctrine about the relation of knmvledge to its
objects can be found there.

The problems of error and un-

certainty 'tvould eventually lead Descartes to a theory of
mind and so to a more explicit doctrine of representative
ideas; but, by that time, he had begun to neglect the doctrine of simplicity, and the representative ideas of the
later philosophy are for the most part complex rather than
simple.

CHAPTER II
THE GENERAL

DOCTRTI~E

The doctrine of simple natures is an early theory
of Descartes and receives scant attention in what are regarded as his more definitive philosophical works.

There-

fore, I do not wish to presume in the reader more than a
general acquaintance with the doctrine.

Accordingly, this

chapter provides a more detailed account of that doctrine.
I do not here enter into the area of dispute outlined in
the introduction; my intention is, instead, to establish
what seems indisputably true about the doctrine.

This

will provide the context within which the controversy
about the ontological status of the simple natures must be
resolved, if it is resolvable.

The chapter will consider

three topics: the nature of the method, the role of the
simple natures in the method, and the three groups of simple natures.
The Nature of the Hethod
A superficial reading of the Regulae might give
birth to the assumption that method, in its two-fold procedure of analysis and synthesis, is a post facto artificial device for testing and re-verifying what we already
know.

Such an assumption \vould be 'tvrongheaded for t'\..YO

7

8

reasons.

First, Descartes views his method as being in no

way an artificial device used to supplement the natural
procedures of the mind.

The method is itself the mind's

natural \·Jay of proceeding in the acquisition of knowledge.
Rule IV states repeatedly Descartes' claim that the cultivation of method is the cultivation of reasoning itself, of
our mvn innate capacities for arriving at certain truth. 1
Analysis and synthesis are, therefore, not a quality-control device imposed upon knowledge ab exteriore, but the
natural procedure of knmvledge itself.

The simple natures,

as end-points of analysis, must therefore belong to the
natural procedure of knowing.
Second (and this follows readily from the first
point), the method does not have as its goal the re-verification of 'ivhat we already knmv.

It is only through the

method that we achieve that insight or mental vision that
1 "Such a science [the I·1athesis Universal is] should

contain the urimary rudiments of human reason • • • " (AT X,
Rule IV, 374?-9). In Rule V he claims that in the proposed
method "lies the sum of all human endeavor." (AT X, Rule V,

37922-23)

Given this, it is not surprising that in the Discourse the cultivation of method has taken on an ethical
import:
I felt it incumbent on me to make a review of the
various occupations of men in this life in order
to try to seek out the best. • • I thought that I
could do no better than to continue in • • • cultivating my Reason, and in advancing myself as much
as possible in the knowledge of the truth in accordance vli th the method 'ivhich I had prescribed myself.
This and all future citations from the Regulae,
Discourse, Meditations, and Principles are taken ~rom the
naidane-~oss translation.
Any significant departures from
their text will be noted.

•
9

becomes knowledge.

2

This seems initially a rather puzzling

position, for what we usually regard as knowledge are the
individual "facts" that we learn about the world through the
senses.

Descartes would be unhappy with such a characteri-

zation of knowledge.

Real knowledge, he believes, is sci-

--

entia, an ordered system of certain truths.

He declares

that certainty i$ not to be found in isolated bits of data,

but in some system in which the interconnection of all knowledge becomes obvious:
If, therefore, anyone vlishes to search out the
truth of things in serious earnest, he ought not
to select any apecial science, for all the sciences are conjoined with each other and interdependent ••• 3

Though he does not disparage the use of the senses,
he refuses to characterize sense experience as knowledge.
It cannot provide the interconnectedness that is the mark
of true knowledge or scientia. The testimony of the senses
"fluctuates," 4 and generalizations made from such testimony
are "frequently fallacious."5

The only true sources of
knowledge are i~tuition and deduction. 6 Intuition and deduction are certain only because analysis and synthesis
afford us insight into the simplest and indubitable elements of knowledge and the ways in \vhich they may be
2AT X, Rule

v,

37915-17.

3AT X, Rule I, 36114-18.
4
14
AT X, Rule III, 368 ,
5AT X, Rule II, 3654 - 5 ~
6 AT X, Rule III, 3689-l 4 •

10

combined.

Various areas of knowledge are interconnected

because they are all constructed from these simple natures.
Since this thesis is concerned with the theory of
knowledge in the Regulae, it must concentrate on those simple natures and their role in knm'lledge.

Though sense data

may sometimes stimulate or at least occasion the knowing
process, the essential characteristics of the early Cartesian theory of knmvledge can be discovered only by discovering the nature of that which is revealed in analysis and
combined in synthesis.
The Role of the Sim;ele Natures in the l1ethod
Analysis is that mental activity by vlhich
II

tole

• • • reduce involved and obscure propositions step by

step to those that are simpler."?

This is done to gain an

understanding of \..;hat is involved in the concept or proposition examined and h01:1 its various aspects 8 are related.
Our use of analysis is most often pragmatic.
sions, we cease dividing the issue v.rhen

vre

On such occa-

have brought the

problem \vithin manageable limits for the purpose at hand.
Further analysis is often possible, but

we may have no

7 AT X, Rule V, 379l7-l9.
8 r employ such vague terminology at this point in
order to avoid a premature conmitment to some interpretation of the ontological status of the basic elements out of
which knowledge is constructed. In fact, the thesis examines the case for a more definitive interpretation of these
elements and concludes that the vagueness is Descartes' own
and cannot be resolved in the Regulae.

...
11

immediate use for it.

Descartes calls the end-point of

analysis the "absolute."9

In this case it is the relative-

ly absolute (relative to the purpose at hand).
On the other hand, it is possible, Descartes believes, to push analysis beyond the point at 1r1hich our present purposes will be satisfied.

Ultimately, we \vill arrive

at the most basic elements of knowledge, those that are no
longer complex and cannot be further divided by analysis.
These truly absolute (maxime absoluta) end-points of analysis are the simple natures.

We have an intuitive apprehen-

sion of them that guarantees the certainty of our knowledge
of them.

This certainty extends to more complex knm'lledge

insofar as it is constructed from these simple natures.

"vle

need to determine precisely what this simplicity is and why
Descartes claims that it provides the foundation for certainty in knowledge.
The simplicity of which he speaks is simplicity in
the order of thought.

Any individual existing object is

in itself simple, but this is different from the order in
\'lhich \ve consider the nature of the object. 10 Thus, although analysis enables us to consider extension separately
from figure and motion separately from duration, this
22
2
9AT X, Rule VI, 381 -382 •
10 "We assert that relatively to our knowledge single things should be taken in an order different from that
in which we should regard them when considered in their
more real nature." AT X, Rule XII, 418.

•
12
provides no justification for assuming the possibility of
their existing independent of each other.
In the search for simple natures, hmv does one know
when to stop analyzing?

This does not seem at all problem-

atic, for \ve would expect the analysis to stop at the point
at \vhich it can no longer continue.

Nevertheless, this will

not be an adequate criterion, for it is sometimes possible
to further abstract from a simple nature.

For example, the

mind can separate the notion of a limit from the notion of
a figure(because a figure has limits).

But limit does not

qualify as a simple nature, for it cannot function unambiguously as a simple element in knowledge.
and equivocal.

It is parasitic

Its meaning remains obscure until it is

linked \vith something like figure, motion, time, pmver, etc.;
and, in each case, the limit becomes something different
from what it \vould be in any of the other cases.

We have

no clear notion of limit apart from what is limited;
II

• • • consequently it is something compounded out of a num-

ber of natures wholly diverse, of which it can be only ambiguously predicated. n 11
Because the goal of analysis is to acquaint us
with the simple natures as the most basic elements of certain knowledge, it would be self-defeating to pursue the
analysis to the point at which certain knowledge is no

11AT X, Rule XII, 4193-5.

...
13

longer to be had.

Descartes expresses this evidential

requisite in the following v1ay: "\le shall call only those
simple the perception of which is so clear and distinct
that they cannot be divided by the mind into several more
distinct perceptions.rr 12 This stipulation guards against
the introduction of such notions as limit as simple natures,
since they do not have the requisite clarity and distinctness.

Nothing in knowledge is gained and much is lost by

pushing the analysis too far. 1 3

Analysis has a point of

diminished epistemological returns.

Simplicity may be de-

fined as the point in analysis at \vhich further analysis
becomes less clear and distinct; the simplicity is one of
evidence.
As can be seen, Descartes is even at this early
period using some sort of doctrine of clarity and distinctness.

There is no further explanation of this in the Regu-

lae, but it is safe to assume that the doctrine is the same
as that in the later philosophy; for the simple natures of
the Regulae meet the criteria for clarity and distinctness
implicit in the Meditations and formulated explicitly in
12AT X, Rule XII, 418 14- 1 7. To be consistent, Descartes should have said that they cannot be divided into
several perceptions as distinct. The point of arrest in
analysis occurs when-aistinctness and clarity begin to lessen.

l3Throughout his philosophical career, Descartes
criticized those who attempt to further analyze the simple
and end up confusing rather than clarifying. See the Regulae, AT X, Rule XII, 4269-13, 42619-21; Search After Truth,
ATX, 523-524; Principles I, X; Letter to l1ersenne, October
16, 1639.

.....
14
the Principles.

To show this will afford us further in-

sight into the doctrine of simplicity of the Regulae.
According to the Principles, a clear (clara) idea
is one that
• • • is present and apparent to an attentive mind
in the same way as we assert that we see objects
clearly when, being present to the regarding eye,
they operate on it with sufficient strength.l4
When vision is clear, the object of vision operates on the
eye with sufficient strength, so that no part of the object
is ignored;

"~:lhen

an idea is clear, we attend to all parts

of it, so that no part is left unthought.

Any perception

of any simple nature must be clear;
For, if our mind attains the least awareness of
i t • . . , i t can be concluded just from this that
we know it entirely. Other~vise, i t could not be
said to be simple, but composed of that which we
perceive and of that of 1.1hich we think we are
ignorant.l5
The simple natures satisfy the criterion for distinctness as well: "• •• the distinct is that which is so
precise and

from all other objects that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear. 1116 That the
di~ferent

simple natures meet this criterion may be shown in two ways.
First, any idea that is perfectly clear must also be distinct.

A perfectly clear perception carries with it a guar-

antee that we perceive that by which the object in question

14Pr1.nc1.p
. . 1 es, I , XLV •
l5AT X, Rule XII, 4202 5-421 2 •
16Pr·1.nc1.p
. 1 es, I , XLV •

P·
15
is different from all other objects.

1

7 The simple natures

are, we have seen, perceived with perfect clarity, if they
are perceived at all.
tinctly.

They must, then, be perceived dis-

Secondly, simplicity itself (even without refer-

ence to clarity) guarantees distinctness.

To see this, con-

sider the hypothesis that tvlo simple natures, x and !' are
not distinct from each other.

The hypothesis could be true

under either of two conditions.
exactly the same perception.

First, ! and ! might be

If that is so, then we are

merely using two names to refer to the same perception; of
course, there is no question of a perception being distinct
from itself, so the hypothesis could not be true under the
first condition.

The second condition is that x and z are

two different perceptions.

If that is so, then they could

be indistinct or confused only if z is a compound of x and
something else, or vice-versa.
would be a simple nature.

In such a case, only one

\ole have shmvn by a reductio that

the indistinct-perception of a simple nature is an impossibility.
This perfect clarity and distinctness in our perception of the simple natures guarantees them a special
epistemic status.

When simple natures are known as simple,

they are known with an apodictic certainty.

Descartes says

that'all these simple natures are knovm per se and never
1 7Principles, I, XLVI; Resp. ad II Obj., AT VI,
11
9
147 • S"ee also L. J. Beck, The t1ethod of Descartes

(London: OXford University Press,

1952), pp. 59-60.

p
. 16

contain any falsity. "

18

If \ve admit to some knowledge of a

simple nature as well as to the knowledge that it is simple, we must also grant that our knoVTledge of it is complete and certain.
In \vhat could any uncertainty consist?

1.fe have al-

ready seen that \ve cannot maintain consistently both the
knm>~ledge

that it is simple and that ". • • over and above

what we have present to us or attain to by
is something hidden from us."l9

thi~~ing,

there

That would be to claim

knowledge of only a part of that which has no parts.
Can our knowledge of a simple nature be falsified
through a failure to refer to some existent extra-mental
object?

This question presumes a

reso~ution

to the central

problem of the thesis: what is the relation of simple natures to the extra-mental world?

I will show eventually

that the problem is not really solvable within the Regulae.
Descartes himself does not consider this issue because he
believes that knowledge can proceed without making judgments about the conformity of mind to vlorld, i.e., that
there can be 'non-existential knowledge.•

The simple na-

tures are understood, and as long as \ve understand them
(without attempting to make existential judgments) we do

18AT X, Rule XII, 42014- 1 5.
l9AT X, Rule XII, 42021 - 2 3.

17
not run the risk of falsification.
But the understanding of a wise man will not be
deceived • • • , since he 'tvill judge that v1hatever
comes to him from his imagination is really depicted
in it, but yet will never assert that the object has
passed complete and 't-Ii thout alteration from the external \'IOrld to his senses, and from the senses to
his imagination, unless he has some previous ground
for believing this.20
The Three Groups of Simple Natures
In Rule XII Descartes divides the simple natures

into three groups: the purely intellectual, the material,
and those 'tvhich can be ascribed univocally to either the
intellectual or the material.

Almost as an afterthought,

he includes the negations of the natures of all three
groups.
He says that the first group, the intellectual simple natures, "are knov-m by the intellect through a certain
inborn light and without the aid of any corporeal imagery." 21
They include thought, knmvledge, doubt, ignorance, volition, etc.

That they are known through a natural light

does not distinguish the first group from the others, for
he characterizes all the simple natures as being known or
intuited through this natural light.

When he claims that

20AT X, Rule XII, 423l3- 20 • If this, in fact,
avoids the problem of falsification, it would also seem to
preclude any characterization of the simple natures as true.
As I shall shov1 later, Descartes skirts this issue with an
objectification of the idea.
21 AT X, Rule XII, 4199-ll.

.
18
the natures are free from falsity, he makes a distinction
between "· •• that faculty • • • by which it [the understanding] has intuitive awareness of things • • • [and]
. h 1. t JU
. d ges. • • • rr 22 None of th e Slmp
. 1 e natha t b y wh 1c
tures can be doubted, because and as long as we restrict
ourselves to such an intuitive a\·tareness of them.

In Rule

v,

he states in a similar vein that there is an "intuitive
apprehension of all those that are absolutely simple." 2 3
And the light metaphor is used to characterize any intuition
whatsoever: "· •• intuition is the undoubting conception
of an unclouded and attentive mind, and springs from the
· ht of reason a 1 one. • • u24
1_!g

The second part of his statement seems to be the
criterion for distinguishing the first group of natures.
He claims that the first group are all known "without the
aid of any corporeal imagery."

This should not be surpris-

ing when we recognize that corporeal imagery \"iOUld be useless: "• •• it is impossible to construct any corporeal
idea \"ihich shall represent to us what the act of knmv-ing is,
what doubt is • • • " 2 5 As it stands, the criterion is only
negative, but it does have a positive claim to make.

The

22AT X Rule XII, 42016- 18 ~

'

23AT X, Rule

v,

37919-20.

24AT X, Rule III, 36818-20.
25AT X, Rule XII, 41912-15.

The emphasis is mine.

19
simple natures of the first group are knowable, but the
knowledge of them is not at all dependent on corporeal
imagery.

There are actually two criteria here: the first

concerns the appropriate use of the pmver of knovring (the
understanding unaided by the imagination); the second concerns the nature of the object of knowledge (that which is
real but non-corporeal).
The second group is composed of the material simple
natures.

These, Descartes says, "are discerned only as
being in bodies." 26 To understand this statement, we must
examine his discussion of necessary relations.

He says

that two natures are united necessarily ". • • when one is
so implied in the concept of another in a confused sort of
way that we cannot conceive either distinctly, if our thought
~ssigns to them separateness from each other." 27 The criterion for a necessary relation between natures x and

~

is

not that we should be unable to intuit x without intuiting
~·

In fact, if that were the criterion, Descartes would

have great di.ff:iculty expla:ining how

! and

~

could be distinct.

He wants, instead, to maintain that the criterion for the
necessary relation between ! and

~

should be the impossi-

bility of intuiting ! clearly and distinctly while stipulating the absence of

~·

As examples of such necessary rela-

tions he offers figure and extension, motion and duration,
26AT X, Rule XII, 41918-19.
27AT X, Rule XII, 4215-8 • The emphasis is mine.

20
etc.

When he claims that the second group of simple natures

are discerned only as being in bodies, he is stating the
necessary relation of these with corporeity or extension.
This would distinguish them from the natures of the first
group.
Further support for this interpretation can be
gleaned from what he says about the third group of natures,
those that can belong to either of the first two groups
without any change of meaning.

He says that they are

"ascribed nou to corporeal things, nm" to spirits, without
distinction." 28 As examples he offers existence, unity,
and duration.

He immediately adds that the common notions,

because they are members of the third group, "can be discerned by the understanding either unaided or when it is
aware of the images of material things." 2 9 This further
distinction will prove interesting for us because of its
intimation that the imagination has a role on the perception of the second and third groups.

The role of the imag-

ination could have implications for the ontological status
of at least these simple natures.

We will examine this

more carefully later.
Besides the common notions, the third group includes various necessary relations.

These relations func-

tion as "bonds for connecting together the other simple
28AT X, Rule XII, 419 20- 21 •
2 9AT X, Rule XII, 419 29-4302 •
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natures, and on their evidence depends whatever we conclude through reasoning."30

As an example he cites:

"things that are all the same as a third thing are the same
as one another."3l

He offers a more comprehensive list in

the Replies to the Second Objections but has reservations
about which are primary and which are derivative.3 2 Moreover, that list is restricted to those necessary relations
employed in arguments for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.

The third group seems to be rather

mixed; it includes Euclidean axioms and (he claims without
benefit of examples) all the basic rules of inference,33 as
well as such natures as existence, unity, and duration.
We might initially be taken aback at finding what
seem to be judgments included in a catalogue of simple perceptions of the understanding.

After all, Descartes him-

self reminds us of the difference between understanding and
judgment.34 He does not, though, regard these necessary
30AT X, Rule XII, 419 24- 26 •
3lAT X, Rule XII, 419 26- 2 7.
3 2Henri Gouhier has compiled a list of these relations as they occur throughout the vrorks of Descartes. See
his La ensee meta h si ue de Descartes (Paris: Librairie
Philosophique J. Vrin,
, pp.
1- •
33smith regards Descartes' claim that these natures
are bonds of inference as some unfortunate regress to Scholastic thinking. See his Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy
(New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), p. 3?, n. 2.
4
3 Although this distinction does not appear as
clearly in the Regulae as it does in the later vrorks, it is
nonetheless there. He claims that we cannot fall into error
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relations as judgments: for (1) they do not assert any
extra-mental existence, and (2) they do not affirm the
inclusion of anything beyond what is clearly and distinctly perceived.

It is a feature of his philosophy that the

truth of at least some propositions can be perceived without any act of judgment.
Nor are these natures as complex as they might seem.
They are, Descartes believes, as simple as the other simple
natures.

As expressions of necessary relations among na-

tures, they cannot be reduced to relations that are simpler;
and as principles of inference they cannot be broken dovm
into simpler principles.
tive.

Their sentential form is decep-

It is not the number of words that distinguishes

simplicity from complexity; it is the non-simplicity of
the "thought" by which the concept in question is perceived.
In addition to the presentation of the three groups,

Descartes includes the negations of and privative terms
corresponding to the simple natures as themselves simple.35
This is not surprising.

He intends to give an account of

the fundamentals of all knowledge; some way of dealing with
with negation must be found.

For two reasons it would be

wrong to claim that the negation of some simple nature x
is a complex of two natures, x and something like negation,
as long as we attend only to what we understandi without
making judgments about it. AT X, Rule XII, 423 5-20.
35AT X, Rule XII, 4203-5.
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privation, non-being, etc.

First, negation cannot itself

be a simple nature, for we can never have the requisite
clear and distinct knov.fledge of it.

Negation, like limi-

tation , is parasitic in that it acquires its specific meaning from the character of that which is being negated.
Second, there is something counter-intuitive about claiming
that the negation of

~

is something added to x.

Descartes

saw this quite clearly, I am sure, by the time of the Meditations.

He argues there that the infinite cannot be a

negation of the finite, "for, • • • there is manifestly
more reality in infinite substance than in finite • • • • "3 6
If Descartes wants to preserve his picture of knowledge as
being built entirely out of atomic elements, he must regard
the negation of each of the natures as itself a simple
nature.
It seems,then, that Descartes has really attempted
to group all elements in knowledge within his doctrine of
simple natures.

The natures themselves are a heterogeneous

lot: they include attributes of mind only, attributes of
body only, attributes of both, principles of inference,
axioms of geometry, necessary relations, and negations.
The mode of cognition varies; some can be perceived by the
understanding alone, some require imagination, and others
may be known in either way.

36 Meditation III.

This, then, is a general
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account of the simple natures of the Regulae.

The thesis

will raise the question: are they ideas or are they elements of extra-mental reality?

CHAPTER III
THE S TI·IPLE NA'I'URES AS REPRESENTATIVE IDRt\..8

This chapter ivill examine the case for interpreting the simple natures as representative ideas.

One claim

(seldom made explicit) is that such an interpretation is
required in order to make the early doctrine compatible
with the later doctrine of representative ideas.

I shall

not examine this claim as it would involve us in a detailed
study of the later philosophy.

Moreover, such external evi-

dence is to be admitted only in support of or after despairing of the possibility of internal evidence.

I shall re-

strict this chapter, therefore, to the internal evidence
of the Regulae for the doctrine of representative ideas.
Such evidence, if present, will indicate that what we know
most directly are our own ideas.

Because Descartes claims

that what we knm.; directly are the simple natures, this
sort of evidence \vould enable us to conclude that the simple natures are ideas rather than extra-mental reality.
What an argument for the representational interpretation
must establish, then, is the essentially mental character
of '\vhat is immediately known.
The Order of Thought and the Order of Nature
In Rule VI, Descartes claims that his method
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differs from that of the Scholastics in that it requires
us to compare things in the order of their interdependence
in knowledge. 1

His presumption is that the Scholastics

neglected the order of knov'lledge in favor of the order of
nature.

Rule VIII offers a similar claim--that the exami-

nation of the simple natures is a consideration of things
only insofar as they are in the understanding. 2 In Rule
XII he notes that the simplicity of any singularly existing
substance is altogether different from simplicity in the
order of thought.3

His message is clear: the simplicity on

which certain knowledge depends is a feature of the way we
understand the world rather than of the way the world
exists independently of our understanding.

He seems, there-

fore, to be claiming that there is something mental about
the simple natures.
LeBlond regards the distinction bet1-veen the tv10 orders as crucial for the determination of the ontological
status of the simple natures:
Notons tout d'abord qu'il ne s'agit pas de "choses"
mais de "notionstt: Descartes a soin de prtfciser, en
COmmenyant Cette etude deSAObjets de la COnnaissance,
qu'il ne s'occupe pas des etres "prout revera existunt," mais seulement "in ordine ad cognitionem
nos-E'ram. n4
1 AT X, Rule VI, 3817-16 •
2AT X, Rule VIII, 3995-6 •
3AT X, Rule XII, 418l-l5.
4 LeBlond, p. 165.
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So far, what LeBlond says seems supported, both by the text
he cites and by the texts I have cited above; Descartes himself has told us that the simplicity with which he is concerned is not the simplicity or unity that any existing
substance has.
things.5

It is therefore not an issue of simple

LeBlond quite safely uses the more non-committal

term "notions."

However, he then commits himself to some-

thing further; '\'/hen he says "notions" he means "ideas":
Des le premier pas, done, notions et choses sont
separees: certes Descartes ne doute nullement que
les choses ne repondent aux idees; mais enfin, des
l'abord, il laisse de c~te la relation de laconnaissance aux choses.6
Thus, he arrives at the conclusion that the simple natures
are .l.deas: "l'inventaire des natures simples est presente,
non com.rne un examen des choses, mais seulement des idees."?
LeBlond's claim is that because Descartes is not discussing
the simplicity of substances, he must therefore be discussing the simplicity of ideas.

This he believes to be the

significance of the distinction bet1.1een the order of under5we should not presume any ontological significance
when Descartes describes the simple natures as "res" (AT X,
Rule VI, 381). A res may indeed be a subsisting entity;
but it can also be-a-mode, a disposition, a distinction, a
law, an idea, etc. It has the same ambiguous all-purpose
usage as the English "thing." Haldane and Ross translate
"res simplicissimae" as "what is quite simple," thereby
preserving the Cartesian ambiguity. See James Collins,
Descartes• Philosophy of Nature (London: Blackwell's, 1971),
Po 12.

6 LeBlond, p. 165.
?LeBlond, p. 172.
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standing and the order of nature.

What is important here

is whether the distinction that Descartes makes between
thought and nature requires that \'/hat is simple be the
thinker's m1n ideas.
S.

v.

Keeling has pointed out a gap in the type of

argument proposed by LeBlond: although the process of analysis is assuredly mental, this by no means insures that the
end-point of analysis (the simple nature) is similarly mental.8

I will show later9 that there is some reason to be-

lieve that the product of analysis is not merely the thinker's own idea, that Descartes, rather, believes it to have
some sort of an objective status.

Presently, though, the

mental or extra-mental character of what is directly known
is still open to question.
Though Keeling merely points out the gap in LeBlond's
argument, Brian O'Neil has a more substantive point to make.
He shO\'IS that the Scholastic realist tradition in \-Thich
Descartes was educated did not regard the thought-nature
distinction as requiring a theory of representative ideas. 10
Realists ordinarily drew such a distinction vrhile still
8 see S. v. Keeling, "Le r~alisme de Descartes et le
r8le des natures simples," p. 77. "C'est le processus
d'analyse seul qui est mental et nonce qu'il atteint ou
decouvre. La subjectivit~ du processus n'entraine aucunement la SUbjectivite de Ce qui est revele'. II
9see Chapter IV.
lOO'Neil, pp.

177-178.
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maintaining the directness of their realism.

It is true,

as we saw above, that Descartes distinguishes his position
from that (those?) of the Scholastics.

His point, though,

was that the Scholastics proceeded to develop knowledge
through the syllogism rather than through the method of
analysis and synthesis.

His rejection of Scholasticism is,

at least in this passage, not a blanket one.

It is entirely

possible, then, that he could share the Scholastic tenet
that the ability to mentally divide what is known does not
necessitate that v1hat is kno\m be itself mental.
Realists, as well as other epistemologists, must
.find some v1ay of accounting for the fact that v-1e can and do
separate mentally \'lhat does not actually exist separately.
A theory that attempts to account for this is a doctrine of
abstraction.

It is essentially such a doctrine of abstrac-

tion that permits Descartes to divide (analyze) mentally
that which he acknowledges as being connected and even
necessarily connected extra-mentally. 11 Within the Scholastic tradition, the possibility of abstraction did not
indicate at all to philosophers that their knowledge of
reality was anything less than direct or immediate.

Aquinas

saw the necessity of acknowledging an order of thought distinct from the order of reality:
11 rn the Regulae Descartes reserves the term "ab-

straction" for those attempts to further analyze what is
already simple. See above, pp. 5-6. He seems later to
abandon such a restrictive usage. See the letter to Gibieuf, January 19, 1642.
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For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in the one 1-1ho understands, is not the same
as the mode of a thing in being; since the thing
understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect,
and not materially according to the mode of a
material thing • • • 12
Similar statements can be found in many of the Scholastics.
See, for example, the Summa Fhilosophica Quadrepartita of
Eustace of St. Pau+, one of the standard textbooks of the
seventeenth century. 1 3
Indeed, the notion that thought differs from nature
must be regarded as ordinary and common-sensical; yet, at
the time of Descartes, it was not generally believed that
it required a theory of representative ideas.
expressed it

O'Neil has

we~l:

The distinction between thought and nature. • •
says nothing more than the well known Scholastic
axiom: "The thing knmvn is in the mind of the knm-rer
after the fashion of the knower." This does not
interpose a veil or deny directness and accuracy
of understanding. It merely says that the process
of understanding is sui generis and will, in consequence, somewhat rearrange the elements of the
world in the process of grasping them.l4
12summa Theologica, Part I, qu. 85, art. 1, cited
in O'Neil, pp. 1?7-1?8.
l3Eustachio a Sancto Paulo, Summa Philosophica, IV,
11-12. This reference is provided by Gilson in his Index
Scholastico-Cartesien, p. 1. Gilson claims t~at this work
"resume fidedement • • • 1' enseignement de 1' Ecole" (p. v).
While it is possible that Descartes did not kno\v of
this work in his youth, we can be sure that he knew of it
at least by 1640, when he refers to it as a "typical textbook." See the letter to I1ersenne, November 11, 1640.
14
o•Neil, p. 177.

31
This does not establish conclusively that there is
no doctrine of representative ideas in the Regulae.
does it establish realism in that work.

Nor

It does not even

establish whether a realist can offer an intelligible account of abstraction.

It does show that it was widely held

at the time of the Regulae that one could make a distinction
between thought and nature and still maintain the directness or immediacy of the knowledge of extra-mental reality.
Unless there is some evidence to the contrary, we have no
reason to believe that Descartes objected to this assumption.
It is worth noting that, by the time of the Meditations, when he has openly declared for the doctrine of
representative ideas, it is not primarily in order to develop a doctrine of abstraction.

Instead, he is concerned with

providing an epistemological framework within which both
doubt and certainty can be conceptually accounted for.

In

order to do this, he proposed a rather rigid gap between
thought and world.

The gap accounts for doubt and error;

the arguments of the various meditations will show how to
bridge the gap and arrive at certainty.
It might be presumptuous to attribute any such epistemological sophistication to the Regulae.

Descartes does

not here seem primarily concerned with such problems.
It seems, then, that the mere occurrence of a distinction between thought and nature does not impel us to
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conclude that Descartes had already opted for a theory of
representative ideas (or for realism).
The Simple Natures:

Innate Ideas?

There occur in the Regulae various allusions to the
inneity of knowledge.

If it can be established that Des-

cartes held a doctrine of innate ideas and that these ideas
are to be identified with the simple natures, then we may
be able to build a case for the representational interpretation.

It would, of course, have to be further established

that the inneity of these simple natures is inconsistent
with any claim to the direct knm•Tledge of extra-mental
reality.
Jean Laporte has offered such an interpretation of
the simple natures.

He cites, first, Descartes' later con-

tention that those ideas are innate vrhich ttinvolve no affirmation or negation. 11 l5

The cognition of the simple na-

tures, as we sa\'1 earlier, requires no affirmation or negation.16

The natures are, therefore, innate.

The argument

relies on the assumption of the continuity of the doctrine,
an assumption which for purposes of the thesis I do not
wish to make.

Hartland-Swann claims that what is really

shown by this is that the simple natures of the early
l5Jean Laporte, Le rationalisme de Descartes (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), pp. 84-85. The citation is from the letter to Hersenne, July 22, 1641.
16see Chapter 2.
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philosophy become the innate ideas of the later philosophy.l7
LeBlond claims the inneity of at least some of the
simple natures exclusively on the evidence of the Regglae.
As \ve have already seen, LeBlond claims that the simple
natures are representative ideas.

He believes that at

least the first group should also be considered innate,
because of Descartes' claim that they are known "by an inborn light." 18 He is reluctant to include the natures of
the second group as innate, because Descartes claims that
experience (the use of the imagination) is essential for
their perception.
ficulty.19
ranted.

Hartland-Swann points out the same dif-

Their reluctance in this respect seems unwar-

It has not been established that extra-mental in-

put, if indeed that is what the imagination provides, would
necessarily be inconsistent with a doctrine of representative and innate ideas.
chapter.

This will be discussed in a later

For nmv, let us assume that the restriction of

inneity to the first group is unwarranted.

If LeBlond has

a case, it \vill be applicable to all the simple natures.
1 7John Hartland-Swann, "Descartes' Simple Natures,"
Philosophy, XXII (1947), 139-142. He finds at least a partial correspondence of the simple natures with the later
innate ideas but concludes that the natures do not "fit
unambiguously into the epistemology and ontology of the
Meditations and Principles."
18
LeBlond, p. 168, n. 2.
1 9Hartland-Swann, p. 141.

34This is supported by the fact that the "natural light" to
which he refers is the condition for the intuition of any
of the simple natures. 20
The supporting text that LeBlond cites is the fol1 owing: ". • • we must note that there are but few pure and
simple natures which either our experiences or some sort of
1 ight innate in us enable us to intuit • • • " 21 If the doctrine of inneity expressed herein is to support the representational interpretation, the inneity must be of such a
sort to support the claim that the immediate object of knowledge is itself mental (rather than extra-mental)and that
. t ~s
. some h ow ~n
. b orn. 22
~
It is significant that in the passage that LeBlond
cites Descartes is not claiming that the immediate object
o:f knm"Yledge is innate.

\-/hat is innate is the "light" '\"lhich

enables us to intuit the simple nature.

This does not

establish the sort of inneity that is needed to conclude
that the simple natures are ideas; it says merely that we
have an innate capacity for understanding these natures.
20see Chapter 2, where I discuss the claim that the
:first group of natures are known by a natural light.
21 AT X, Rule VI, 383ll-l4-.
22 I use "inborn" '\'iith some hesitation, because innatists do not, as a rule, regard the neo-nate as mentally
cognizant of those ideas that are claimed to be innate. It
would be more proper to regard such ideas as belonging to
the mind solely in virtue of its existence as a rational
mind. Ordinarily, being born is the preface to one's existence as a rational mind; hence, innate ideas are said to
be "inborn." See the letter to Hyperaspistes, August, 164-l.

35
This is consistent with other references to inneity that
occur in the Regulae.
11

In Rule X Descartes speaks of an

inborn faculty of invention" that becomes articulated as

the rules of method. 2 3

In Rule I he states that the culti-

vation of this sane method is itself the cultivation of the
lumen naturale. 24

The thrust of these passages is that we

have a natural capacity for using that method which will
enable us to "see" the truth of things.

The visual metaphor

is appropriate for the description of intuition; it further
explains the light metaphor.

What is innate, then, is the

natural capacity for understanding the natures through the
use of method.

This is similar to Descartes' later doctrine

of inneity, as expressed by Kenny:
No matter what X may be, the idea of X is innate
in the sense that the capacity to think of X,
imagine X, feel X, experience X is inborn in us
and is not given us by the stimulus that on a particular occasion makes us think of or experience x. 25
There is, therefore, evidence for a doctrine of inneity in at least this minimal sense.

The passage LeBlond

cites invokes this minimal sense of inneity.

It is not

sufficient, however, for the establishment of a doctrine of
innate ideas that would lead necessarily to representationalism.

The claim for an innate capacity of understanding

2 3AT X, Rule X, 4031 9.
24

AT X, Rule I, 361

18

•

-25Anthony Kenny, Descartes: a Study of his Philos£PhY (Nei'l York: Random House, 1968), p. 104.
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does not assert the kind of inneity that restricts direct
knowledge to a knowledge of one's own mind.

It says merely

that knovlledge of any sort presumes an innate capacity for
that sort of knowledge.
That this is inneity in a sense so minimal that it
does not distinguish innatists from other epistemologists
is a rather troubling possibility.

That there is no know-

ledge without a capacity for knmving seems a rather trivial
claim--one that should be acceptable to all but the skeptic.
Perhaps the claim becomes something more than trivial when
lve recognize that Descartes regarded the various intellectual capacities as being an explicit product of an intentional design by a creator.

That these capacities are

matched to the way the world exists is part of the miracle
of creation, a manifestation of the creator's goodness, and
a necessity if there is to be any knorlledge of the extramental world.
In conclusion, we have seen that the only sense in

which Descartes can be said to have explicitly committed
himself to a theory of innate ideas seems compatible with
realism as lvell as with the representative theory.

Ve

have seen also that the distinction between the order of
understanding and the order of nature does not provide sufficient evidence for concluding that the simple natures are
essentially ideas.

These are the two major arguments I have

found for the representative interpretation.
been found to be conclusive.

Neither has

CHAPTER IV
THE SIMPLE NATURES AS EXTRA-T·1ENTAL EXISTENTS
In the last chapter, textual grounds for the repre-

sentational interpretation were examined and found insufficient.

The present chapter will conduct a similar examina-

tion of the grounds for the realist interpretation and will
arrive at similarly negative conclusions.

To make a case

for the realist interpretation, it is not sufficient to
establish that, if \..re knmv the simple natures, we necessarily know the nature of extra-mental reality.

Such a claim

would indeed be true of a realist interpretation of simple
natures, but it could also be true of any doctrine of
representative ideas that does not lapse into solipsism.
A realist interpretation must shmv also that the simple
natures do not just represent the extra-mental world but
that the;y are actually constitutive of it, that they are
"ontal elements." 1
This chapter is composed of four sections.

In the

first, I \vill examine two arguments offered by O'Neil.
These will be shmvn to have been based on remarks taken
out of context by him and misinterpreted.

In the second,

I will examine the relevance of sense experience to the
1

The term is employed by Keeling. See his Descartes
(London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 236, n. 1.
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claim for realism.

This will be dealt with specifically

by an analysis of the role of imagination in knowledge.

In the third, I will examine the claim that the simple
natures are somehow "objective."

While there is good rea-

son for accepting this claim, I show that the objectivity
of the natures does not demand the realist interpretation.
In the fourth, I will look at Keeling's claim that, because
the simple natures cannot be universals, they must be particulars and, so, must exist in nature.
Two Short Arguments

In this section I will examine two short arguments
for a realism of simple natures.
have been proposed by O'Neil.

Both of the arguments

I have chosen to group them

together because they are short, because their author is
the same, and because they both misinterpret remarks made
by Descartes in a discussion of occult qualities.

In Rules XII and XIV Descartes, as an example of
the application of his method, cites the search for the
simple natures that are involved in a magnet.

lie says that

nthere can be nothing to know in the magnet which does not
consist in certain simple natures evident in themselves." 2
By proceeding methodically in the examination, one can
feel confident that "he has discovered the real nature of
2AT X, Rule XII, 42716- 1 9.
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the magnet insofar as it can be discovered by human intelligence with the data of experience." 3

Descartes cites the

example of the magnet as an instantiation of his claim that
"the whole of human knowledge consists in a distinct perception of the way in which those simple natures combine in
4
the composition of other objects."
If' 1r1e remember this,
we will avoid the error of hoping to discover something new
and occult in the magnet.5

Descartes' intention, then, in

the discussion of the magnet is to warn us that there is
nothing occult here; everything about the magnet that we
can know is the combination of simple natures and is discoverable through the method.
O'Neil believes that the passage has another signi:ficance: "Certainly the factors \vhich make a magnet behave
the v1ay it does are not ideas in our head. n 6 The remark is
somewhat elliptical.

I believe that the follo·w·ing amplifi-

cation remains true to O'Neil's intent: Descartes is claiming that to know the simple natures involved is to know the
:factors that make a magnet behave the way it does.
are not \vhat make the magnet so behave.

Ideas

Therefore, the sim-

ple natures are not ideas.

3AT X, Rule XII, 427 2 5- 26 •
4 AT X, Rule XII, 427 3 - 6 •
5AT X, Rule XIV. Such ne\v discoveries would be
possible only in the case of a divine intellect or with the
acquisition of some new sense.
6 o•Neil, p. 169.
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What O'Neil neglects to consider is this: to claim
that in knovring the simple natures involved we thereby
understand the behavior of a magnet does not necessarily
commit Descartes to the claim that the simple natures are
what make a magnet behave in its characteristic way.

As

stated at the beginning of this chapter, the realist interpretation must establish more than that if we know the simple natures, 1.ve know \vhat extra-mental reality must be like.
It must be further established that these natures are constitutive of extra-mental reality.

O'Neil has found Des-

cartes claiming that, in knowing certain simple natures, \ve
know the essential nature of the magnet.

Descartes does

indeed say that much, but that is not enough to establish
realism.

Descartes, in the passage in question, is best

read as merely claiming that the method, with the knowledge
of simple natures that it provides, should be considered
adequate for the knowledge of all that is knmvable.

It is

a mistake to read into the passage any claim about the ontological status of the simple natures.
O'Neil presents a second argument that purports to
establish the extra-mental existence of at least the material simple natures.?

Extension, Descartes has said, is it-

self a simple nature.8 In Rule XIV he makes several other
statements about extension: "By extension we understand
7o'Neil, p. 170.
8 AT X, Rule XII, 419 1 9.
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whatever has length, breadth, and depth, not inquiring lvhether it be real body or merely space • • • u9 "Hence we
announce that by extension ioJe do not here mean anything
distinct and separate from the extended object itself • • • " 10
O'Neil merely presents these texts and immediately coneludes: "I think the conclusion is unavoidable that some
simple natures have a species of ontological independence,
and are constituent of the world.n 11 He presents no argument for this conclusion, but we can surmise vlhat the argument might be:
The extended object is extra-mentally existent.
Extension is not separable from the extra-mental
object.
Extension, then, is extra-mentally existent.
Extension is a simple nature.
Therefore, this simple nature is extra-mentally
existent.
The simple natures are knovm directly.
Therefore, to know this simple nature is to know
directly an extra-mental existent.
If the argument is correct, it must follow that Descartes
is a realist, at least in the case of knovrledge of material
objects.
What O'Neil fails to note is the context of Descartes' remarks.

Descartes is attempting to shmv that care-

ful use of the method liill rectify what he regards as "illconceived principles.n

One such principle is that space is

9AT X, Rule XIV, 442l?-l9.
10AT X, Rule XIV, 442 2 5- 26 o
11 o•N
re1."1 , p. 1?0 •
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something distinct from extended objects.

He claims that

space is not anything different from real bodies.

It is

not some occult entity that will still exist even in the
absence of all extended being; space is not some container
for the world.

This discussion occurs in the very passage

from which O'Neil quotes.

If, when we say "extension" we

mean "space," we are not really referring to anything but
the extended object, because "• •• we make it a rule not
to recognize those metaphysical entities that cannot really
.
. t.1on. 1112 This is a position
. th e 1mag1na
b e presen t e d 1n
that he continued to maintain through the later philosophy.l3
O'Neil interprets Descartes as saying that extension as a simple nature is not in any way different from
the extended body.

On this rests his claim to realism in

the knowledge of this nature.

All that Descartes is actu-

ally claiming here is that space is not empty, that there
can be no such thing as a vacuum.

O'Neil's interpretation

is textually unsupported; the passage makes no claims about
the ontological status of the simple nature extension.

12AT X, Rule XIV, 442 26- 2 9.
l3see Principles, II, X; Descartes to Mersenne,
January 9, 1639; Descartes to Chanut, June 6, 1647. Most
important, though, are the text of Rule XIV and the letter
to Mersenne of April 15, 1630, which indicates that Descartes was already claiming that he could prove the impossibility of a vacuum.

43
The Argument from the Role of the Imagination
Descartes says that the imagination has a role to
play in the perception of the simple natures of both the
second and third groups, namely, those that are material
and those that may be either material or spiritual with no
change in meaning.

All sensory input from the extra-mental

world is channelled ultimately through the imagination.
Thus, it might appear that, in claiming a role for the
imagination, Descartes is affirming the necessity of a cognitive contact with the extra-mental world for the perception of the second and third groups of natures.

To deter-

mine whether this contact with the extra-mental world
necessitates a realist interpretation,

\'le

must examine

what the imagination is for Descartes and make more specifie its role in knowledge.
section.

That is the project of this

It will ultimately be shovvn that, \-Thile the imag-

ination has a role to play in the perception of these natures, that role is not of a sort to necessitate the realist interpretation.

Moreover, it provides evidence for the

impossibility of the realist interpretation.
Kemp Smith has postulated a realism on the above
basis:
In the Regulae there is • • • no doctrine of innate
ideas and no doctrine of representative perception-none at least, of the type which postulates that physical entities can be known only by way of mental
duplicates.l4

14Norman Kemp Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy
of Descartes (New York: Russell and Russell, 1966), p. 51.
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In the case of those simple

natu~es

that can be in material

objects (i.e., those of the second and third groups), the
realism is supported thus:
The self, which in its earthbound life is an embodied self, is • • • irnmedia tely aware of the
physical patterns which external objects, by way
of their action on the bodily sense-organs, imprint
on the brain.l5
Smith cites no specific texts in support of this interpretation.

What we must establish is whether this immediate

awareness of patterns of physical objects is the same thing
as thepereepticn ofas:inple nature and, if not, '\'lhat its relation is to the perception of simple natures.

This is essen-

tially the problem of the relation of understanding to imagination.
The Cartesian discussion of the imagination in the
Regulae takes two divergent directions, which must both be
accounted for.

Ch.tre me !and, we find Descartes insisting

that we be wary of the entrapments of a misplaced confidence
in sense experience.

In the acquisition of certain know-

ledge, we must rely only on intuition and deduction (which
. ~•t se lf a ser~a
. 1 ~n
. t u~•t•~on ) • 16 Int u1.•t•1.on, h e \vrl.•t es, 1.s
.
~s
"not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering construc1

tions of the imagination • • • " 7

This might lead us to

believe that sense experience and imagination have absolutely

15~.'

p.

52.

16AT X, Rule IX, 40o16-l9.

l7AT X, Rule III, 36814- 16•

no role in knowledge.
On the other hand, Descartes decries those philosophers who, "• •• neglecting experience, imagine that
truth will spring from their brain like Pallas from the
18 This would make us suspect that the
head of Zeus."
imagination will be relevant to the acquisition of knowledge.

The discussion of simple natures in Rule XII reaf-

firms this role of the imagination al\'lays and necessarily
in the perception of the second group of simple natures and
always but not necessarily in the perception of the third
group. 1 9 Whether this role commands the direct realist
interpretation is the matter under discussion.
Initially, ,,.re must clarify exactly what the imagination is for Descartes.

Although the Regulae says that

it is actually a physical organ that takes on the shape of
the object perceived, 20 it soon becomes clear that the role
that he accords to the imagination is not explicable in
purely physical terms.

He seems often to regard the imag-

ination as the awareness of the shapes taken on by the physical

organ.

Some years later, he admits in the correspondence to using the term in both senses. 21 The active knowing
18AT X, Rule XII, 4191 5-2 5. Note that even if it
can be established that the role of the imagination requires
a direct realism, this would hold true only of the second
group. The first group would not be affected, and the status of the third group would remain ambiguous.
l9AT X, Rule V, 38014- 16
Q

20AT X, Rule XII, 414l9- 24 •
21 Descartes to I1ersenne, April 21, 1641.
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power (vis cognoscens) sometimes along with the imagination
is applied to the sensus communis; in this case we are said
to sense. 22 But this is not the role of the imagination
that interests us, for Descartes never equates sensing with
knowing.

Kemp Smith seems oblivious to this point; his

interpretation does not draw the distinction.
We are properly said to understand, Descartes
claims, only \'Then the vjs cognoscens operates alone.

This

is a rather strange claim for Descartes, for in the very
next paragraph he asserts that the "understanding can be
moved by the imagination." 2 3 He goes on to claim that
II

• • • if the understanding proposes to examine something

that can refer to a body, we must form the idea of that
.
. th e lmag1na
.
. t.lon. u 24
as d.ls t.lnc tl y as possl.bl e ln
th lng
This is what is again proposed in the cases of the second
and third groups of simple natures.
cartes proposing?

\fuat exactly is Des-

Is he claiming that the consciousness of

the image is itself certain knmvledge?
might be a direct realist.

If so, then he

I say "might," for it

'"~ould

have to be further established that the imagination, or
better, the image imagined was a faithful representation of
extra-mental reality.
such a presumption.

Descartes, though, warns us against
The i"'is e man

22AT X, Rule XII, 4-15 27-4-161 •
23AT X, Rule XII, 4-161 70
24AT X, Rule XII, 4-1628_4-171.
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• • • \vill judge that \vhatever comes to him from
his imagination is really depicted in it, but yet
will never assert that the object has passed complete and without any alteration from the external
world to his senses and from his senses to his
imagination • • • 25
A direct realist would have to assume prima facie the faithfulness of this passing, and Descartes does not.

I f we re-

gard the imagination, then, as not having any certain and
direct connection with extra-mental reality, it would become
quite difficult to maintain that, because the imagination
serves the understanding, the understanding thereby has a
direct contact vlith extra-mental reality.
Moreover, even if v1e could presume that the world
was faithfully reproduced in our imagination, we would
still have to ascertain the nature of the relation between
imagination and understanding.

Descartes would be a real-

ist only if this relation was of a sort to preserve the
directness of knowledge.

He says that the understanding
26 In Ru 1 e
.
. t lOn.
.
can b e move d ( moverl. possl. t) b y th e lmaglna

XIV he affirms that a question about extension (meaning
about any of the second group of natures) "• •• must be
set before the imagination • • • , for this is the best
way to make it clear to the understanding.n 2 7 Somewhat
later in the same rule, he tells us that it is possible and
25AT X, Rule XII, 42313-20.
26AT X, Rule XII, 4161 7.
27AT X, Rule XIV, 43810-11.
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even necessary to use the imagination as an aid (imagina!1onis adjument~). 28

For, he tells us, by fixing an image

in the imagination we will insure that we do not imprudently
exclude some nature that belongs to it.

This is similar to

the claim in Rule XII that, while the understanding alone
is capable of perceiving truth, it ought nevertheless to be
aided by the imagination. 2 9
In summary, there are two distinct occurrences when

a simple nature is understood with the aid of the imagination.

First, there is consciousness of an image.

Second,

there is an understanding of the nature(s) which the image
instantiates.

The two should not be confused; the occur-

rence of a mental image is not itself understanding of the
natures instantiated in that image.

This explains Des-

cartes' warning against dependence on the imagination.
\~at

needs to be established is the relation be-

tween the two occurrences.

Having a mental picture before

us seems to insure that we will omit nothing relevant and
will not count as a material nature something unimaginable.
To claim that something is material and yet in principle
unimaginable is, according to Descartes, a contradiction.
The constant use of the imagination as an aid to understanding will prevent such errors as pretending to understand
empty space.

28AT X, Rule XIV, 44516- 2 3.
2 9AT X, Rule XII, 4101 7- 2 3.
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Any attempt to construe this as realism must deal
with a difficulty that Kemp Smith has not acknowledged.

As

we discussed earlier, we must account for the Cartesian
claim that certain knowledge is possible only when we refrain
from judging that our mental images pass from the world directly, i.e., -vlithout alteration.

This indicates that we

cannot count on being in immediate cognitive contact v.fith
the extra-mental world, and the search for knowledge ought
not to proceed under the assumption that we are.
a major problem for the realist interpretation.

This poses
In addi-

tion, when the actual role of the imagination is made explicit, we find that it by no means presumes contact '\·lith
the extra-mental.

It serves as a useful picture in the mind,

a mental picture of an instance of what we are trying to
understand.

The understanding does not abstract from the

mental picture, but Descartes presumes that we can nevertheless compare our understanding of nature x with an imaginary
picture of some object incorporating

~·

The imagination pro-

vides a psychological help for directing attention, but
kno-vrledge is not in any way extracted from it.

Thus, even

if it could be established that the imagination faithfully
pictures the extra-mental world, the way in \-Thich the understanding makes use of the imagination again precludes directness .of knm'lledge.

\>lith such a lack of direct cognitive

contact \vith an extra-mental world, I doubt that a case
could be made for realism on the grounds of what Descartes
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says about the imagination in the Regulae.
The Argument from the Objectivity of the Simple Natures
There are numerous considerations that indicate that
Descartes regarded the simple natures as having a sort of
objective status.

By "objective," I mean that their real-

ity and place in knowledge is not merely that conferred upon
them by the knower.

The simple natures would be what they

are regardless of the thinking processes of any given thinker.

One way of accounting for this objective status would

be to interpre.t the natures as
mental reality.

11

ontal elements 11 of extra-

I will examine the reasons for claiming

this objective status and will show that there is a much
more plausible basis for it than the realist interpretation
offers.

Let us first examine the reasons for claiming the

objective status of the simple natures.
As evidence,

no~first

of all that the criteria of

clarity and distinctness, with which the natures are known,
are put forth as logical criteria.

One may object (with

Leibniz) that these criteria end up being psychological.
That may be true, but it is still true that Descartes intended them to be logical.30

It is not by choice or by the

whim of the thinker that some perceptions are clear and
distinct while others are not.

Some perceptions can be had

30Alan Gewirtz, 11 Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes," Philosoph;r, 18:1943, 17-36.
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clearly and distinctly and others cannot; the content of
the perception (as well as the methodical approach of the
perceiver) guarantees this.

I have shown earlier that the

simplicity of the nature apprehended guarantees the clarity
and distinctness of its apprehension.

This simplicity is

not a property of the perceiver as subject; some perceptions
are simple and they can only be perceived as simple.

There

is something about them that imposes itself on the thinker.
What can be perceived as simple and what can be perceived
clearly and distinctly are determined, not exclusively by
the thinker, but by the nature of what is thought.
Second, there are real distinctions among the simple
natures; each is different from the others and necessarily
so.

Keeling states that "• •• chacune a son caract~re

unique et

homog~ne

qui la distingue de toute autre.

distinction n'est pas rationis mais realis • • •

Cette
This

guaranteed heterogeneity is due to the .fact that, if tv10 natures were not different (in content) .from each other, they
would be only one nature.
tinct .from all others.

Each nature is perceived as dis-

The distinctness is grounded in the

nature itself, not in the thinker.
Third, Descartes himself claims that the simple natures have an objective status.

This claim occurs in one

o.f the .few references to simple natures after the Regulae.
3lKeeling, "Le realisme de Descartes et le r~le des
natures simples," p. 78.
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Descartes is discussing another theory of common notions,
that of Lord Herbert of Cherbury.

Cherbury had claimed that

universal assent was the criterion of indubitable common
notions.3 2 Descar·bes rejects this; his own common notions
(a subset of the third group of simple natures) may be universally assented to, but that is not why they are indubitable.
tivity.

Universalized assent is merely generalized subjecDescartes claims that there needs to be an objec-

tive foundation for this universalized assent:
• • • I have no criteria for • • • [the common notions as truths] except the light of nature. The
two criteria (universal assent and the light of
nature] agree in part; for since all men have the
same natural light~ it seems they should have the
same notions • • • 3~
This natural light is, of course, the light of reason.

It

is not merely the fact that all rational men assent to the
common notions that makes them indubitably true; more
important is the claim that it is rational to assent to
them.

They seem, therefore, to be objectively grounded in

some way, so that it would be not merely exceptional but
irrational to refuse to assent to them.
Fourth, as I remarked earlier, the knowledge of
the simple natures is characterized as both true and certain.

There must be some sort of objective foundation for

truth, or the term is meaningless.

This objective founda-

tion must enable us to account for both truth and falsity.
3 2Lord Edward Herbert of Cherbury, De Veritate.
33Descartes to Mersenne, October 16, 1639o
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Moreover, all knowledge must be about something.

The sim-

ple natures are objects of knowledge.
It seems necessary, therefore, to attribute some
sort of objective status to the simple natures.

If they

could be regarded as "ontal elements," their objectivity
would indeed be established.

A correspondence theory of

truth could then be developed, resting on the claim that
the natures, as extra-mental, must be objective.

If there

is another plausible account, though, which also establishes the objectivity of the natures and is based on the texts,
then we have no reason for preferring the realist interpretation.

I believe that there is such an alternative ac-

count, explicit in the later philosophy and at least seminal in the Regulae.

Let us examine it.

In the Meditations Descartes states that

11

•••

every clear and distinct perception is without doubt something and hence cannot derive its origin from what is
nought • • • 11 34 The same indication that clear and distinct truths are themselves something real seems to be
implicit in Meditation I.

\.Je

may regard certain eternal

truths (e.g., the truths of mathematics and geometry) as
still true even if we doubt the existence of an extramental world.

In such a case, the truths expressed in

these propositions, would not be founded in the physical
world.

Descartes wants to maintain that such truths are

34 Meditation IV.

54
not founded in the 1-vorld, but in something else.
In 1630 (less than a year after the estimated date

of the Regulae), Descartes goes so far as to maintain that
such eternal truths or essences have a reality of their
own both as God's ideas and as what must be true of any
world.35

In fact, it seems plausible to regard the simple

natures as themselves having their foundation in the deity,
as any essence must be expressed in terms of these simple
natures.

To establish the case for this more definitively,

it would have to be shown that the same things (or types of
things) that Descartes called eternal essences must be collections of inter-related natures.

I am confident that this

could be done, although it is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Thus grounding the simple natures in the deity \vould

enable us to establish the objectivity needed to characterize the knowledge of the simple natures as true and as dependent on the light of reason.

It would also provide a

context for the rather opaque statement about the quasidivine character of the human intellect: "· •• The human
mind has in it something we may call divine, wherein are
scattered the first germs of useful modes of thought."3 6
If we should ultimately find this interpretation
acceptable, how will it affect the status of the simple
natures?

It would indicate that the realist interpretation

35Descartes to f'lersenne, J.VIay 6 and 27, 1630.
also Meditation V.
36 AT X, Rule IV, 373 7 - 9 •

See

55
is not the only way of accounting for the objectivity of the
simple natures.

It does not, though, provide a move defin-

itive statement of what the epistemology of the Regulae
actually is.
unanswered.

Certain p.ertinent questions are still left
First, we have no positive statement about

the relation of our ideas to God's ideas.
"represent" God's ideas?

Do our ideas

If so, then the representative

theory would be the appropriate interpretation.

The repre-

sentativeness would then be double: our ideas would represent God's ideas which, in turn, would represent extramental reality.

If, instead, we know the divine ideas

directly, we will have a direct knmvledge of something extramentally real, inasmuch as God's ideas have a reality not
dependent on our thought.

But this would not be a direct

knowledge of something extra-mentally existent; it would,
therefore, not constitute a realism as we have understood
it in this thesis.
Second, there is no indication whether the term
"simple natures" refers to our ideas, to God's ideas, or
to both indifferently.

This makes it impossible to estab-

1 ish what we are claiming to knm;r most directly and immedi-

ately v1hen \ve know the simple natures.

It seems that,

even under this alternative explanation of the objectivity
of the simple natures, we are still not able to give a
definitive characterization of the epistemology of the
Regulae.

It has been shmvn, though, that the realist
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interpretation is not the only explanation for the objective status of the simple natures and not even the most
plausible one.
The Simple Natures and Universals
Keeling, in support of the realist interpretation,
argues that the simple natures cannot be interpreted in the
representational frame1.vork.

The representational interpre-

tation would require viewing the natures as universals or
concepts that would represent various individuals.

This,

he argues, is inconsistent with what Descartes says about
the simple natures:
• • • Les concepts sont des abstractions ayant comet extension, done essentiellement des
idees qui sont applicables aux choses. I1ais les
natures simples n'ont hi compr~hension ni extension.
On ne peut pas dire qu'on les applique a quelque
chose; on les decouvre tout simplement et on les
connait pour ce qu'elles sont.37
pr~ension

Keeling cites no text from the Regulae in support of his
claim.3 8 He assumes that the simple natures will be either
universals or extra-mentally existing singulars.

Let us

not question this assumption of the basic epistemological
framework, though he offers no foundation for it.

Instead,

let us see why he refuses to characterize the simple natures
37Keeling, "Le r~alisme de Descartes et le rSle des
natures simples," p. 78.
3BMy own reading of the text shows only one obvious reference to a doctrine of universals in the Regulae.
Se'e AT X, Rule XIV, 43911-19. This passage is so ambiguous
that I fail to see in it support for any specific doctrine
of universals.
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as universals.
The natures cannot be universals, he says, because
they are "quite simply discovered and kno\'m for 1.vhat they
are."

This seems to allude to Descartes' claim that the

natures are uer se nota.

I believe that Keeling has mis-

taken the significance of this claim.

In Rule VIII, Des-

cartes distinguishes the simple natures from compounds
formed by the understanding. 39

The simple natures are

knmrn in themselves (per se nota) precisely because they
are not compounded out of and therefore not known in terms
of anything else.

\{.hen Descartes says again in Rule XII

that they are per se nota, 1.ve find that it is with something
similar in mind.

He says that, because the natures are
per se nota, they are 1.vholly free from .falsity. 40 Either
you understand one or you don't; as shown in Chapter II,
nothing in between the t1vo extremes is even intelligible.
The claim that the simple natures are per se nota is not
itself a claim that they are never applied in any way to
singular objects; it is merely a claim that we do not

ar~

rive at an understanding of the simple natures through an
understanding of anything else.

That the simple natures

are discovered in themselves has no implications for the

39AT X, Rule VIII, 39916-19 • Here Descartes claims

that the simple natures are "per se cognitis," but I do
not believe that he means anything other tlian "per se nota."
40AT X, Rule XII, 42014- 1 5.
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question of whether they are subsequently to be "applied"
to individual extra-mental existents.
find Keeling's argument unsatisfactory.

For this reason I
He needs to estab-

lish that a direct knowledge of the simple natures is inconsistent with their being "applicable to things."

He

has failed to do so; moreover, he has failed even to notice that he must do so.
In summary, our discussion of the realist inter-

pretation has failed to establish any conclusive evidence
for it.

All the arguments presented have been shown to

be either inconclusive or based on a misinterpretation of
the texts.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The chapters of this thesis have led to very few
positive conclusions about the status of Cartesian epistemology at the time of the Regulae.

I have shown that

the distinction Descartes draws between the order of the
understanding and the order of nature should not be uncritically regarded as evidence for the representational
interpretation.

Similarly the various references to in-

neity are inconclusive, and, taken in a minimal sense,
would be compatible with a realist interpretation.

In

short, I find no conclusive evidence for the representational interpretation.
Nor can the realist interpretation be established
conclusively.

We have seen Keeling's argument that the

natures must be interpreted as parts of extra-mental
reality because they cannot be universal concepts applied
or referred to things.

His argument

was rejected because

it was not established that the simple natures cannot be
referred to things.

The two short arguments by O'Neil,

when interpreted in context, were similarly dismissed as
irrelevant to the issue.

The attenpt to establish real-

ism on the basis of some extra-mental input fed through
the imagination was dismissed.
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If anything, the role
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that Descartes accords the imagination establishes a
of direct contact with the extra-mental world.

~

It seems,

therefore, to be more amenable to the representational
interpretation.

Again, though, the doctrine is not clear

enough to be conclusive.
I feel compelled to conclude that the Regulae
does not have an epistemology that falls squarely within
one of the tv10 interpretations under discussion.

Descartes

does not appear to have been conscious of or concerned ·Ni th
the distinction betv1een direct realism and representationalism.

Consider all the topics we have discussed: the

nature of mental abstraction, the nature of inneity, the
nature of universals, the relation between thought and
world, and the role of the imagination (and, therefore, of
sense) in understanding.

Each of these is an area in

which the direct realist and the representationalist would
propose substantially different theories.

We have found,

though, that Descartes is ambiguous on each of these issues.

The ambiguity should not be surprising.

Descartes

is not primarily concerned in the Regulae with the establishment of an ontologically grounded epistemology.

His

concern is to establish rules for the use of the mind; the
Regulae is essentially a treatise on method.

We should

not, therefore, expect to find considered responses to the
questions this thesis has examined.

In the Regulae Des-

cartes did not consider the importance of the distinction
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between direct realism and representationalism.

The doc-

trine of the simple natures is best regarded as a somewhat
naive and superficial account of the various "parts" of
knowledge, perhaps adequate for considerations of method
but not an answer to fundamental epistemological issues.
It is only on a naive level that quantity, relations, principles of inference, negations, existence can all be regarded as one a par in knowledge, as parts or pieces of
knowledge.

I f we seek out a level on which all these can

be dealt with alike, I believe that level must remain
rat~ ~erficial.

On this level, the question of their

ontological status does not arise and is therefore not
resolved.
The Regulae seek to establish practical rules for
the acquisition of certain knowledge.

It is only later

that Descartes seriously poses the question of whether
certain knowledge is even possible.

Only \vhen he begins

to take the device of the methodic doubt seriously, does
the question of the ontological status of the natures
(which by then are made complex and called ideas or essences) come into discussion.

Under the doubt, we are forced

to acknowledge the possibility that all that we formerly
thought we knew about the world might be merely ideas in
our mind with no extra-mental referent.

This doubt is

sustained, at least partially, through the first five
Meditations.

While sustaining the doubt, Descartes
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develops his conception of the nature of human consciousness.

This must account for the possibility of my ideas

being nothing more than mental events with a certain representational structure.

The conception that emerges is of

consciousness as a container; the intentional aspect of
consciousness, a requirement for realism, is not considered.

When consciousness is viewed as a container for

ideas, Descartes commits himself to the doctrine of representative ideas.

Thus, it is only the concerns of the

later philosophy that impelled Descartes to assert the
doctrine of representative ideas.

These were not his con-

cerns at the \vriting of the Regulae.
I find no compelling reasons for not regarding the
simple natures as a rather undeveloped proto-representative theory, but the justification for selecting such an
interpretation could not come from the internal evidence
of the Regulae.

It is, therefore, legitimate to use the

later doctrine to shed light on the Regulae, but the seminal character of the earlier work should not be overblown
into a definitive epistemology.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Texts
Descartes, Rene. Oeuvres de Descartes. Edited by
Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. Paris: Leopold
Cerf, 1897-1913.
• The Philosophical \.forks of Descartes. Edited
--------and translated by Elisabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T.
Ross. Cambridge: The University Press, 1970.
• Descartes: Philosophical Letters. Edited and
--------translated by Anthony Kenny. London: Oxford University Press, 1970.
Other Sources
Beck, L. J. The l"lethod of Descartes.
versity Press, 1952.

London: OXford Uni-

Blond, Jean Le. "Les natures simples chez Descartes."
Archives de Philosophie. 1937 (13), 163-80.
Gewirtz, Alan. "Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes."
Philosophy. 1943 (18), 17-36.
Gilson, Etienne. Index scolastico-cart~sien.
Burt Franklln.

New York:

Hartland-Swann, John. "Descartes' Simple Natures."
osophy. 1947 (22), 139-52.

Phil-

Joachim, Harold. Descartes' Rules for the Direction of
the Mind. Reconstituted from notes taken by his
pupils. Edited by Errol E. Harris. New York:
l"Iacmillan, 1957.
Keeling, S. V.
1934.

Descartes.

London: Oxford University Press,

• "En quoi consiste l'idealisme
----gres
Descartes. Travaux du IXe
tional de Philosophie,

cart~sien?"
Con~res

1937. 3-8.

63

ConInterna-

64

Keeling, S. v.
"Le r~alisme de Descartes et le r~>le des
natures simples." Revue de :Me'taphysique. 1937
( 44) ' 6 3-99 •
Laporte, Jean. Le rationalisme de Descartes. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1950.
O'Neil, Brian. "Cartesian Simple Natures." Journal of
the History of Philosophy. 1972 (10), 161-?9.

----·

Realism in Descartes'
nlversl y of New

Smith, Norman Kemp. New Studies in the Philoso
carteso New Yor : · usse 1 and Russell,

Des-

• Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy.
-------Russell and Russell, 1962.

New York:

APPROVAL SHEET
The thesis subnitted by l'Iichael D. Smith has been read
and approved by the following committee:
Dr. Peter J. r:ax\vell, Director
Assistant Professor, Philosophy, Loyola
Dr. Kenneth 'I'hompson, Jr.
Associate Professor, Philosophy, Loyola
The final copies have been examined by the director of the
thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the
fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and
that the thesis is noH given final approval by the Corn..11ittee
with reference to content and form.
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment
of the requireoents for the degree of Master of Arts.

--

Date

65

